More about international copyright—Congresses and Parliaments made up of men who know nothing about the matter—Mr. Clemens disputes with Lord ThwingⒺexplanatory note his statement that there is no property in ideas.
I believe that our Heavenly Father invented man because he was disappointed in the monkey. I believe that whenever a human being, of even the highest intelligence and culture, delivers an opinion upon a matter apart from his particular and especial line of interest, training, and experience, it will always be an opinion of so foolish and so valueless a sort that it can be depended upon to suggest to our Heavenly Father that the human being is another disappointmentⒶtextual note, and that he is no considerable improvement upon the monkey. Congresses and Parliaments are not made up of authors and publishers, but of lawyers, agriculturalists, merchants, manufacturers, bankers, and so on. When bills are proposed affecting these great industries, they get prompt and intelligent attention, because there are so many members of the law-making bodies who are personally and profoundly interested in these things and ready to rise up and fight for or against them with their best strength and energy. These bills are discussed and explained by men who know all about the interests involved in them; men recognized as being competent to explain and discuss and furnish authoritative information to the ignorant. As a result, perhapsⒶtextual note no important English or American statutes are uncompromisingly and hopelessly idiotic except the copyright statutes of these two countries. The Congresses and the Parliaments are always, and must always remain, in the condition of the British Parliaments of seventy-five and eighty years ago, when they were called [begin page 289] upon to legislate upon a matter which was absolutely new to the whole body of them and concerning which they were as strictly and comprehensively ignorant as the unborn child is of theology.Ⓐtextual note There were no railroad men in those Parliaments; the members had to inform themselves through the statements made to them by Stephenson, and they considered him a visionary, a half-lunatic, possibly even ass and poet.Ⓐtextual note Through lack of previous knowledge and experience of railway matters, they were unable to understand Stephenson. His explanations, so simple to himself, were but a fog to those well-meaning legislators; so far as they were concerned, he was talking riddles, and riddles which seemed to be meaningless; riddles which seemed also to be dreams and insanities. Still, being gentlemen, and kindly and humane, they listened to Stephenson patiently, benevolently, charitably, until at last, in a burst of irritation, he lost his prudence and proclaimed that he would yet prove to the world that he could drive a steam locomotive over iron rails at the impossible speed of twelve miles an hour!Ⓐtextual note Ⓔexplanatory note That finished him. After that,Ⓐtextual note the law-makers imposed upon themselves no further polite reserves, but called him, frankly, a dreamer, a crank, a lunatic.
Copyright has always had to face what Stephenson faced—bodies of law-makers absolutely ignorant of the matter they were called upon to legislate about; also absolutely unteachable, in the circumstances, and bound to remain so—themselves and their successors—until a day when they shall be stockholders in publishing houses and personally interested in finding out something about authorship and the book trade—a day which is not at all likely to arrive during the term of the present geological epoch.
Authors sometimes understand their side of the question, but this is rare; none of them understands the publisher’s side of it. A man must be both author and publisher, and experienced in the scorchingⒶtextual note griefs and trials of both industries, before he is competent to go before a Copyright Committee of Parliament or Congress and afford it information of any considerable value. A thousand, possibly ten thousand, valuable speeches have been made in Congresses and Parliaments upon great corporation interests, for the men who made them had been competently equipped by personal suffering and experience to treat those great matters intelligently; but, so far as I know, no publisher of great authority has ever sat in a law-making body and made a speech in his trade’s interest that was worth remembering, or that has been remembered. So far as I know, only one author has ever made a memorable speech before a law-making body in the interest of his trade—that was Macaulay. I think his speech is called great to this day, by both authors and publishers; whereas the speech is so exhaustively ignorant of its subject, and so trivial and jejune in its reasoningsⒺexplanatory note, that to the person who has been both author and publisher it ranks as another and formidable evidence, and possibly even proof, that in discarding the monkey and substituting man, our Father in Heaven did the monkey an undeserved injustice.
Consider a simple example: if you could prove that only twenty idiots are born in a century, and that each of them, by special genius, was able to make an article of commerce which no one else could make;Ⓐtextual note and which was able to furnish the idiot, and his descendants after him, an income sufficient for the modest and economical support of half a dozen [begin page 290] persons, there is no Congress and no Parliament in all Christendom that would dream of descending to the shabbiness of limiting that trifling income to a term of years, in order that it might be enjoyed thereafter by persons who had no sort of claim upon it. I know that this would happen, because all Congresses and Parliaments have a kindly feeling for idiots, and a compassion for them, on account of personal experience and heredity. Neither England nor America has been able to produce, in a century, any more than twenty authors whose books have been able to outlive the copyright limit of forty-two years, yet the Congresses and the Parliaments stick to the forty-two-year limit greedily, intensely, pathetically, and do seem to believe, by some kind of insane reasoning, that somebody is in some way benefited by this trivial robbery inflicted upon the families of twenty authors in the course of a hundred years. The most uncompromising and unlimited stupidity can invent nothing stupider than this; not even the monkey can get down to its level.
In a century we have produced two hundred and twenty thousand books; not a bathtub-fullⒶtextual note of them are still alive and marketable. The case would have been the same if the copyright limit had been a thousand years. It would be entirely safe to make it a thousand years, and it would also be properly respectable and courteous to do it.
When I was in London seven years ago, I was haled before the Copyright Committee of the House of Lords, who were considering a bill to add eight entire years to the copyright limit, and make it fiftyⒺexplanatory note. One of the ablest men in the House of Lords did the most of the question-askingⒶtextual note—Lord ThwingⒺexplanatory note—but he seemed to me to be a most striking example of how unintelligent a human being can be when he sets out to discuss a matter about which he has had no personal training, and no personal experience. There was a long talk—but I wish to confine myself to a single detail of it. Lord Thwing asked me what I thought would be a fair and just copyright limit. I said a million years—that is to say, copyright in perpetuity. The answer seemed to outrage him; it quite plainly irritated him. He asked me if I was not aware of the factⒶtextual note that it had long ago been decided that there could be no property in ideas, and that as a book consisted merely of ideas, it was not entitled to rank as property or enjoy the protections extended to property. I said I was aware that somebody, at some time or other, had given birth to that astonishing superstition, and that an ostensibly intelligent human race had accepted it with enthusiasm, without taking the trouble to examine it and find out that it was an empty inspiration and not entitled to respect. I added that in spite of its being regarded as a fact, and as alsoⒶtextual note well charged with wisdom, it had not been respected by any Parliament or Congress since Queen Anne’s time; that in her day, byⒶtextual note the changing of perpetual copyright to a limited copyright of fourteen years, its claimⒶtextual note as property was recognized; Ⓐtextual note that the retaining of a limit of any kind—of even fourteen years, for instance—was a recognition of the fact that the ideas of which a book consisted were property.
Lord Thwing was not affected by these reasonings—certainly he was not convinced. He said that the fact remained that a book, being merely a collocation of ideas, was not in any sense property, and that no book was entitled to perpetual existence as property, or would ever receive that grace at the hands of a legislature entrusted with the interests and well-being of the nation.
[begin page 291] I said I should be obliged to take issue with that statement, for the reason that perpetual copyright was already existent in England, and had been granted by aⒶtextual note Parliament or Parliaments entrusted with the duty of protecting the interests and well-being of the nation. He asked for the evidence of this, and I said that the New and Old Testaments had been granted perpetual copyright in England, and that several other religious books had also been granted perpetual copyright in England, and that these perpetual copyrights were not enjoyed by the hungry widows and children of poor authors, but were the property of the press of Oxford UniversityⒺexplanatory note, an institution quite well able to live without this charitable favoritism. I was vain of this unanswerable hit, but I concealed it.Ⓐtextual note
With the gentleness and modesty which were born in me, I then went on and pleaded against the assumption that a book is not properly property because it is founded upon ideas,Ⓐtextual note and is built of ideasⒶtextual note from its cellar to its roof. I said it would not be possible for anybody to mention to me a piece of property of any kind which was not based in the same way, and built from cellar to roof out of just that same material—ideas.
Lord Thwing suggested real estate. I said there was not a foot of real estate on the globe whose value, if it had any, was not the result of ideas, and of nothing except ideas. I could have given him a million instances. I could have said that if a man should take an ignorant and useless dog and train him to be a good setter, or a good shepherd dog, the dog would now be a more or less valuable property, and would be salable at a more or less profitable figure, andⒶtextual note that this acquired value would be merely the result of an idea practically and intelligently applied—the idea of making valuable a dog that hadⒶtextual note previously possessed no value. I could have said that the smoothing-iron, the wash-tub, the shingle or the slate for a roof, the invention of clothing, and all the improvements that the ages have added, were all the results of men’s thinkings and men’s application of ideas; that but for these ideas, these properties would not have existed; that in all cases they owe their existence to ideas, and that in this way they become property, and valuable. I could have said that but for those inspirations called ideas, there would be no railways, no telegraphs, no printing-press, no phonographs, no telephones—no anything in the whole earth that is called property and has a value. I did say that that holy thing—real estate—that sacred thing which enjoys perpetual copyright everywhere, is like all other properties—its value is born of an idea, and every time that that value is increased it is because of the application of further ideas to it, and for no other reason. I said that if by chance there were a companyⒶtextual note of twenty white men camping in the middle of Africa, it could easily happen that while all of the twenty realized that there was not an acre of ground in the whole vast landscape in view at the time that possessed even the value of a discarded oyster can, it could also happen that there could be one man in that companyⒶtextual note equipped with ideas—a far-seeing man who could perceive that at some distant day a railway would pass through this region and that this camping-ground would infallibly become the site of a prosperous city, of flourishing industries. It could easily happen that that man would be bright enough to gather together the black chiefs of the tribes of that region and buy that whole district for a dozen rifles and a barrel of whiskyⒶtextual note, and go home and lay the deeds away for the eventual vast profit of his children. It could easily come [begin page 292] true that in time that city would be built and that land made valuable beyond imagination, and the man’s children rich beyond their wildestⒶtextual note dreams, and that this shining result would proceed from that man’s idea Ⓐtextual note, and from no other source; that if there were any real justice in the world, the ideas in a book would rank breast to breast with the ideas which created value for real estate and all other properties in the earth, and then it would be recognized that an author’s children are as fairly entitled to the results of his ideas as are the children of any brewer in England, or of any owner of houses and lands and perpetual-copyright Bibles.
Lord Thwing] The family name of Henry, first Baron Thring (1818–1907), appears consistently in the typescripts as “Thwing,” leaving very little doubt that Hobby understood Clemens to be saying “Thwing.” Clemens did not correct that spelling; in fact, when Hobby once typed “Thring” in a later dictation he “corrected” it to “Thwing” (AD, 26 Dec 1906).
statements made to them by Stephenson . . . twelve miles an hour!] English engineer George Stephenson (1781–1848), the “father of the railways,” appeared before a House of Commons committee in 1825 to support a proposed railway between Liverpool and Manchester. The story of his testimony became a commonplace of nineteenth-century journalism. Clemens’s considerably elaborated version may ultimately derive from the popular account of Samuel Smiles:
In his strong Northumbrian dialect, he [Stephenson] struggled for an utterance, in the face of the sneers, interruptions, and ridicule of the opponents of the measure, and even of the Committee, some of whom shook their heads and whispered doubts as to his sanity, when he energetically avowed that he could make the locomotive go at the rate of twelve miles an hour! (Smiles 1857, 231)
In A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, Clemens placed Stephenson in the company of Gutenberg, James Watt, and Alexander Graham Bell, “the creators of this world—after God” ( CY, 369).
Macaulay . . . trivial and jejune in its reasonings] During the House of Commons debates on what would become the Copyright Act of 1842, Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800–1859) made two renowned speeches (on 5 February 1841 and 6 April 1842) against proposed copyright schemes. In his first speech he claimed that copyright was equivalent to a monopoly and opposed an attempt to extend it to sixty years after an author’s death. His second stressed the justice and fairness of an equal term of copyright for all books and proposed the law that was ultimately passed: see the note at 290.17–19. Macaulay’s biographer (and nephew), G. O. Trevelyan, called this speech “as amusing as an essay of Elia, and as convincing as a proof of Euclid.” Clemens was very familiar with the works of Macaulay, one of his favorite writers, these strictures on the copyright speeches notwithstanding (Trevelyan 1876, 2:134–36; Gribben 1980, 1:434–36, 2:712).
in London seven years ago . . . add eight entire years to the copyright limit, and make it fifty] On 3 April 1900, five members of a Select Committee of the House of Lords heard Clemens’s testimony on the two copyright bills that were then before Parliament. Since 1842 Britain had recognized copyright in a literary work for a term of the author’s lifetime plus seven years, or forty-two years from the date of publication, whichever proved longer. One bill under consideration proposed a term of the author’s lifetime plus thirty years. Clemens read a written statement in which he argued for perpetual copyright, and was then questioned by the committee (Draper 1901, 40, 45; “Mark Twain on Copyright,” The Publishers’ Circular, 7 Apr 1900, 367–68; “Mark Twain,” New York Times, 21 Apr 1900, BR7; SLC 2002, 112 n. 3).
One of the ablest men in the House of Lords did the most of the question-asking—Lord Thwing] In this dictation Clemens takes considerable liberties with the facts as they appear from the published minutes of the committee session. In particular he inflates the role of Lord Thring, making him his chief interlocutor; in fact, it appears that all the statements and questions that Clemens attributes to Lord Thring were made by others or not made at all (House of Lords 1900).
New and Old Testaments had been granted perpetual copyright . . . the press of Oxford University] In the United Kingdom, copyright in the Authorized Version of the Bible is vested in perpetuity in the Crown, which delegates it to the King’s Printer and the presses of Oxford and Cambridge universities. The situation for the Book of Common Prayer is analogous. In the Autobiographical Dictation of 30 July 1907, Clemens identifies publisher John Murray as the source of his information (Bentley 1997, 372, 386).
Source documents.
TS1 ribbon Typescript, leaves numbered 1426–37, made from Hobby’s notes and revised.TS1 carbon Typescript carbon, leaves numbered 1426–37, revised.
Clemens revised TS1 ribbon, and copied his revisions (accurately) to TS1 carbon, which he continued to revise. He marked the first page of TS1 carbon ‘Usable. (5 Review pages)’, but no part of the dictation was published.
In this dictation, mention is frequently made of ‘Lord Thwing’. This peer’s name was ‘Thring’; but the typescripts offer abundant evidence that, in dictating, Clemens pronounced it ‘Thwing.’ There is no indication that Hobby was asked to correct this; and on a later dictation he wrote ‘Thwing’ more than once on multiple typescripts (AD, 26 December 1906). Following our textual policy, we adhere to Clemens’s misinformed (or, conceivably, puckish) transformation of Lord Thring’s name.